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 StruËni rad
The author reviews the checks and balances system as a precondition for the 
successful development of a rule of law state in Vietnam. Apart from the general 
considerations of the defi nition of the rule of law and its principles, the author 
gives a theoretical analysis of the functioning of the checks and balances regime 
in the rule of law state, their most important characteristics and also emphasises 
the consequences of a governmental system devoid of checks and balances. The 
main conclusion reached is that the system of checks and balances is necessary 
for the creation of the “rule of law state” and that its development is never suc-
cessful without the creation of an effective and practical state-power check regime 
through the public system to ensure the balance of the three powers (legislative, 
executive, and judicial).
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Note by The International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul 
University College of Law: In 1991, in response to shifting political dynamics 
similar to those found in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the 9th 
Vietnamese National Party Congress adopted a political strategy to rejuvenate 
the Vietnamese political system, as well as forestall a downward trend in the 
Vietnamese national economy. The strategy established specifi c goals for the 
Vietnamese government to achieve in order to advance “Doi Moi” (i.e. State Re-
newal) - a national policy designed to revamp the Vietnamese political, economic 
and legal infrastructure.1 In 2001, the 10th Vietnamese National Party Congress 
reiterated its commitment to Doi Moi and directed State agencies to comply fully 
with the policy. It further directed State agencies to present a report outlining 
their progress to the 11th Vietnamese National Party Congress in January 2011. 
It likewise directed Vietnamese State agencies to draft a 10-year socio-economic 
development strategy (for the years 2011-2020) and to do so in time for presen-
tation to the 11th Congress. It is anticipated that when this report is presented 
to the 11th Vietnamese National Party Congress, sub-committees of the Congress 
will mandate a number of changes in national political personnel, as well as plot 
the future organization of the Congress and the Country.
In December 2009, in anticipation of the 11th Congress, Vietnamese State 
agencies submitted a draft report to the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam. The draft report outlined the 20-year progress of Doi Moi in 
all fi elds of governance, including law, economics, socio-culture, and political in-
frastructure and development. Signifi cantly, the draft report highlighted a number 
of shortcomings concerning the progress of Doi Moi. In particular, it indicated 
that the results achieved to date had not matched “national potential.” In fact, 
the draft report specifi cally noted that the Vietnamese economy remained non-
competitive on the global stage, in part because of offi cial corruption and ineffi -
cient political institutions. Upon receiving - and approving - this draft report, the 
Central Committee directed that the forthcoming 10-year development strategy 
(for 2011-2020) focus on reforming the Vietnamese education sector, increasing 
the quality of “human resources,” and restructuring the national government.2
1 For a more in-depth discussion of the forthcoming Congress, see: Vietnamese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs website at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807 
105039/ns090706170032, last accessed January 7, 2010.
2 See Vietnam.net website at  http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/2009/07/856576/, last 
accessed January 7, 2010.
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In light of these historic developments, A/Prof. Dr. Sc. Le Van Cam (“Le 
Cam”) - one of only two Doctors of Law currently working in Vietnam - has 
submitted his article to IHRLI. The article will be jointly published in Vietnam. 
Signifi cantly, the article suggests State offi cials are ignoring learned critics. It 
intimates that some offi cials may be corrupt, some may be acting arbitrarily and 
all are acting non-transparently. It further intimates that because some offi cials 
may be engaging in what Le Cam calls “depravations of power,” they are subject 
to being “overthrown”. Le Cam concludes his article with the observation that 
when a “State Apparatus . . . is completely destroyed,” a “new State power 
system” - with a new legal and political system - must be established. In this 
regard, Le Cam calls for his government to dedicate itself to the rule of law, 
organize around the principal of checks and balances of power, and commit 
itself to the advancement of society, freedom, democracy and human rights.
I.  OVERVIEW REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF “RULE OF LAW” 
AND ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES:
The development of a successful “rule of law State,” requires that its citizens 
- particularly its lawyers - understand precisely what constitutes the rule of law. 
However, such understanding is diffi cult given the vague and extremely broad 
nature of the term. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that an analysis of 
the legal theory of Vietnam and other countries, as well as of the international 
community, reveals that the defi nition of a “rule of law State” varies greatly.3
Notwithstanding these diffi culties, for the purposes of this paper, I will 
defi ne the term “rule of law State” as:
A civil authority (public power) in the political system of a civil society, 
established on the basis of advanced legal theories of human nature (such as 
equality, humanity, democracy and legislation), that aims to: ensure the respect 
and protection of human rights and freedoms; ensure the primacy of law in 
all areas of social life; ensure the supremacy of law (the Constitution fi rst) in 
all activities of the State; guarantee the separation of governmental powers 
3 Analysis of the various existing defi nitions is not the goal of this paper. For further dis-
cussion regarding the diffi culty in defi ning “rule of law” see The Rule of Law Handbook, ch. 
2 Defi ning the Rule of Law Problem , 2009, at  http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
rule-of-law_2009.pdf, accessed January 12, 2010.
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into three branches (legislative, executive and judicial branches); and check 
the three branches of government through public power and the mastery of 
the people.4
Understanding the elements of this defi nition can help us understand the 
special characteristics which refl ect its underlying basic principles. Consequently, 
based on this defi nition, and also based on the understanding of the practical 
applications of the rule of law in developed countries, there are seven basic 
elements that must exist in order for a State to be recognized as legitimate (i.e. 
in order for it to be recognized as a “rule of law State”) by the international 
community. An analysis of these seven elements will help the Vietnamese people 
fi nd ways to develop their own true “rule of law State.”5
The seven elements necessary for a State to be a “rule of law State” are as 
follows:
1) The State must be the sole power organization (i.e. sole exerciser of public 
power) within the political system of a civil society; 
2) The State must be based on advanced legal principals, including equality, 
humanity, democracy and legislation; 
3) The State must ensure respect for - and protection of - human rights and 
liberty; 
4) The State must ensure the supremacy of its laws (beginning with its Consti-
tution) in all activities of the State. It must likewise ensure the application 
of these laws in all areas of social life; 
5) The State must separate the power of its government into branches, which 
should - most effi ciently - include a legislative branch, an executive branch, 
and a judicial branch; 
6) The State must ensure its branches of government are subject to a system of 
checks and balances; and 
7) The State must ensure the effective governance of the people. 
These seven basic elements of a “rule of law State” manifest the undeniable 
nature of advancement, democracy and humanity. Each are worthy of discussion. 
4 See Le Cam, “Rule of Law Doctrine and Practical Implementation in Russian Federa-
tion,” Commented by Dr. Sc. Pham Xuan Son, Dr. Sc. Luong Dinh Hai and LLD Nguyen 
Canh Hop, Publishing House of Vietnam Science-Technology Association in Russian Fed-
eration, Moscow (1997)(Vietnamese, with summary in English and Russian).
5 In my opinion, such a State is one of the people, by the people, and for the people rather 
than just a so-called rule of law State or a State based on hollow written declarations of 
politics.
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However, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus my analysis on the sixth 
principle (i.e. checks and balances) and discuss how we should enforce this 
principle in Vietnam.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE 
OPERATION OF A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES IN A 
RULE OF LAW STATE:
First: Creating effective domestic systems of checks and balances has been a 
desire of mankind for the past 1,000 years. This longing for a system of checks 
and balances can be traced back to John Locke and Montesquieu. Such scholars 
highlighted the importance of the establishment of the “rule of law State” in 
order to ensure human rights and liberty of the people and to prevent inequal-
ity, unfairness, and governmental corruption.
Second: The most basic requirement for a State to be subject to the rule of 
law is that it possesses a system of checks and balances. Such a system can only be 
achieved through a separation of governmental powers among the three branches 
(legislative, executive, and judicial).
Third: In principle, the separation of power in a “rule of law State” will 
create an effective balance between the three constituent branches of govern-
ment. Hence, the term “checks and balances” consists of two elements which 
are closely linked and interact with one another.6 An examination of these two 
elements follows:
1) “Checks” means to ensure the practical effective organization and imple-
mentation of activities of each branch of government. However, this kind 
of check is never absolutely done. Rather, it is controlled (checked) by the 
two other branches in order to ensure that public institutions and their staff 
conform to the constitution and provisions of the law. In other words, this 
kind of check will create limits during the organization and implementation 
of governmental power. 
6 It is neccessary to specify the nature of the two elements of “checks” and “balances,” as 
some of our leaders (even high-ranking politicians) think that these two elements are 
too transcendent. That is because the leaders are too busy with large workloads and have 
little time for a thorough study of the nature of the terms. Their assistants (“inferior 
strategists”) also do not understand the term well, or do not have deep understanding of 
the nature of the two elements. 
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2) “Balance” means the clear and transparent division of power (authority, func-
tion and task) between public institutions of the three branches (legislative, 
executive, and judicial). It is instituted in order to avoid abuses of power (i.e. 
to ensure the balance of power among these institutions so that no branch 
has the opportunity or ability to prevail over the other branches).7 Such 
a policy on concentration of power, and clear division and assignment of 
responsibilities, is fully appropriate in the context of the development of 
socialism. 
Organization of the State apparatus under such a policy of “checks and ba-
lances” has the following consequences: 1) governmental power will be evenly 
maintained in a manner that does not contradict democratic ideals; 2) clear 
division and assignment of responsibilities will result; and 3) it will increase 
the professionalization of agency staff.8
Fourth: Only when a State’s checks and balances exist in the literal sense 
will there ever exist an incentive for governmental offi cials to abide by the 
Constitution and the law. This prevents the deprivation of power and its serious 
consequences, which are unacceptable in a rule of law State.9 When offi cials abide by 
the Constitution and the law, the following are prevented:
1) abusing, exceeding or losing authority; 
2) agencies, organizations, units or individuals being beyond the law or out of 
control of authorized State agencies; 
3) overreaching bureaucracy, imperativeness, authoritative attitude, irrespon-
sibility; 
4) ignorance of the suffering of the poor; 
5) corruption and arbitrary use of State budget and property (which comes 
from tax contributions of the people through their hard work) for individual 
benefi ts; 
6) the purchase of higher titles of degree by persons who have not earned them; 
and 
7 Regarding this issue, A/Prof. Dr. Nguyen Manh Khang argues that the less clear the division 
of the limit of power is, the less effective and effi cient the check of power is.
8 See: Nguyen Manh Khang, “Legal Bases for State Power Check-Oversight”, in Prof. Dr. 
Sc. Dao Tri Uc, A/Prof. Dr. Vo Khanh Vinh (editors), Oversight and Regime of Oversight 
of State Power in Vietnam (reference book), People’s Public Security Publishing House, 
Hanoi (2003), p. 41. 
9 It is also strongly condemned by people struggling for the successful development of the 
rule of law in Vietnam.
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7) the decline and degradation of ethics resulting in the loss of the confi dence 
of the people and low prestige, etc. 
Fifth: Deprivations of power (and the consequences thereof, mentioned 
above) are caused by a lack of a State checks and balances system in the literal sense 
(especially lack of “checks and balances” among State institutions of the three 
branches during the organization and realization of State power). In this regard, 
A/Prof. Dr. Chu Hong Thanh has argued that it is logical that an emphasis 
on “checks and balance” is a basic principle in the organization and operation 
of the State and that, thanks to this element, no State agency is fully given 
power to infl uence or prevail over other agencies. At the same time, no agency 
or organization is beyond the law without check, oversight or supervision of 
other agencies.10
Sixth: Finally, it should be noted that elements of the State checks and balances 
system mentioned in this paper are interpreted in the literal sense. In other words, 
due to limitations of the scope and space of this paper, only internal State checks and 
balances systems are analyzed - i.e. internal checks of the State apparatus through checks 
and balances among State institutions of the three branches of a “rule of law State,” 
but not external State checks and balances systems (such as State power-check 
regimes of the ruling party, social organizations, the people, etc.).
III. DEFINITION AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF A SYSTEM OF 
CHECKS AND BALANCES:
During discussions regarding effective regimens of checks of the whole power 
system, as well as the requirements necessary for establishing such regimes, Prof. 
Dr. Sc. Dao Tri addressed the current Vietnamese legal system and logically 
enunciated two requirements necessary for its reform:
“First: Effective regimens must be able to check the whole government 
system from the external point of view. However, if the regimens (i.e. mechanisms) 
themselves are an internal part of the power system subject to checking, they are 
not effective;
10 See: Chu Hong Thanh, “Issues on oversight of State power in Vietnam”, in Prof. Dr. Sc. 
Dao Tri Uc, A/Prof. Dr. Vo Khanh Vinh (editors), Oversight and Regime of Oversight of State 
Power in Vietnam (reference book), People’s Public Security Publishing House. Hanoi 
(2003), p. 47.
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Second: Effective regimens must have a measure of independence to check 
and control various aspects of the State’s power.”11
Based on a scientifi c understanding of the theoretical issues mentioned 
above, as well as a practical understanding of the organization and realiza-
tion of State power-checks in “rule of law States” in developed countries,12 I 
believe the term “checks and balances in a rule of law State“ should generally be 
understood as follows:
A State ‘power-check mechanism’ in a ‘rule of law State’ must be constituted 
by a general system of methods and principles provided for in the Constitu-
tion and other basic laws of a country. It serves as the underlying legal basis 
for relevant agencies of the State apparatus (i.e. legislative, executive, judicial 
branches). It regulates the organization and realization of State power and 
does so by ensuring that the State conducts its activities in conformity with 
constitutional and legal parameters. These parameters must be specifi ed in legal 
documents which are issued and implemented by central State agencies - and 
11 Dao Tri Uc, “Defi nition on Oversight of State Power Realization and Oversight Re-
gimes”, in Prof. Dr. Sc. Dao Tri Uc, A/Prof. Dr. Vo Khanh Vinh (editors), Oversight and 
Regime of Oversight of State Power in Vietnam (reference book), People’s Public Security 
Publishing House, Hanoi (2003), p.12
12 For example, see: Trirkin V. E., “Constitutional Law in Some Countries”, Legal Publishing 
House, Moscow (1997) (Russian); Trirkin V. E., “Constitutional Law in Some Countries: 
US, UK, France, Italia, Spain, Greece, Germany, Japan, Canada”, Second edition with 
revision and supplement, Bek Publishing House, Moscow (1997) (Russian); Trirkin V.E., 
and “Constitutional Law of in Some Countries out of Eastern Europe, Textbooks and 
References”, Norma-Infra Publishing House, Moscow (1996) (Russian). And see: Izeev. 
B. X., Constitution - Rule of Law - Constitutional Court (Textbooks). See also: Baglai M.V., 
Constitutional Law of Russian Federation Textbooks for Universities, Norma-Infra Publishing 
House, Moscow (1998) (Russian); Mikhalieva H.V., Constitutional Law of in Some SNG 
Countries (Textbooks), Legal Publishing House, Moscow (1998) (Russian); Sulzenko Iu. 
L., Lecture on Constitutional Law of Russian Federation. Institute of State and Law under Rus-
sian Academy of Social Sciences, Legal Publishing House, Moscow (1997) (Russian); Con-
stitutional Justice in SNG and Baltic Countries: Normative documents (Chief Editor M. A. 
Mitriukov), Zertxal Publishing House, Moscow (1998) (Russian); Prof. Dr. Sc. Dao Tri 
Uc, A/Prof. Dr. Nguyen Nhu Phat (Co-editors), Constitutional Jurisdiction and Establish-
ment of a Model of Constitutional Jurisdiction in Vietnam, People’s Public Security Publishing 
House, Hanoi (2007); Dr. Cao Van Lie, Introduction of Countries and Forms of State in 
the World, Youth Publishing House, Hanoi (2003); and Offi cial Documents of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the Xth Congress, including “Parliaments in the World”, 
Hanoi, (1999). And others.
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leaders of such agencies - during constitutional proceedings, or in documents 
produced during judicial cases involving the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions. Furthermore, the legal parameters of a State power-check mechanism 
in a rule of law State must be clearly articulated in such a way as to ensure that 
the realization of State power is kept in conformity with the provisions and 
limitations provided within the Constitution and other normative provisions 
of the law. By adopting such a regime, a State ensures systemic injection of 
‘checks and balance’ mechanisms within the various branches of a ‘rule of law 
State.’ It also protects the common interests of the people and the civil society. 
It effectively protects the underlying basis of the constitutional regime. And 
it ensures the adoption of human rights and freedoms of citizens as the most 
noble social values of the civilization.
Based on this defi nition of “checks and balances” in a “rule of law State”, and 
also based on my independent research of the practical principles underlying 
the organization and realization of State power, I believe it is logical to infer 
six basic characteristics (or signs) of State power-check regimes in developed 
“rule of law States”. These are as follows:
First: State power-check mechanisms in a “rule of law State” must include 
a system of methods and principles specifi ed and mandated in the Constitution and 
other fundamental national laws. These methods and principles must serve as the 
legal bases for the relevant agencies of the State apparatus assigned to oversee 
the organization and operation of the State’s power;
Second: State power-check mechanisms in a “rule of law State” must include 
specifi c methods to review the constitutionality and legality of certain legal documents 
issued by central agencies and their leaders;
Third: State power-check mechanisms in a “rule of law State” must include 
the possibility of conducting constitutional review proceedings in cases relating 
to constitutional provisions;
Fourth: State power-check mechanisms in a “rule of law State” must aim 
at ensuring the organization of State power is in line with the provisions of the Con-
stitution and the law;
Fifth: State power-check mechanisms in a “rule of law State” must create 
checks and balances” among three State branches (legislative, executive, and judi-
cial) of the State and do so for the common interest of the people and the civil 
society;
Sixth: Finally, State-power check mechanisms in a “rule of law State” must 
effectively contribute to the protection of the underlying basis of a constitu-
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tional regime, and also to the human rights and freedoms of its citizens as the 
most noble social values of civilization.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF A GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM DEVOID OF 
CHECKS OF BALANCES:
It has repeatedly been demonstrated that governmental systems which fail 
to adopt - and effectively implement - a system of “checks and balances” will 
undoubtedly suffer a number of negative governance and social-psycho conse-
quences.13 These consequences include, but are not limited to, the following:
13 For example, see: History of Philosophy (4 volumes). Volume I, Institute of Philosophy un-
der USSR Academy of Social Sciences, Moscow (1957)(Russian); History of Political and 
Legal Doctrines (Textbooks for Universities and Faculties of Law), Chief Editor Prof. Dr. 
Sc. V. X. Hercexiantx, Norma-M-Codes, Moscow (1995)(Russian); Alekxeev X. X, Rule of 
Law Philosophy, Norma Publishing House, Moscow (Russian)(1997), p.1; Law and Power; 
Advance Publishing House, Moscow (1998)(Russian); Ixaev I. A., History of Russian State 
and Law (Forth edition with revision and supplement), Legal Publishing House, Moscow 
(2004)(Russian); Alain Laurent (Professor in Philosophy - Lecturer of Political and So-
cial Advance Training School), Books on Modern Knowledge: History of Individualism 
(translated by Phan Ngoc), World Publishing House, Hanoi (1999); Dominque Folsc-
heid (Professor of University of Marne-Il-Valle), Gender and Destiny (translated by Van 
Toan-Trong Phung), Culture and Information Publishing House, Hanoi (2003); Art of Being 
Human (translated by Van Nghi and Quoc Bao), Labour Social Publishing House, Hanoi 
(2004); Nguyen Chau-Nguyen Minh Tien (Editors), What do Tibetans Think About Death 
(Where Will Dead People Go?), Culture and Information Publishing House, Hanoi (2005); 
Ngoc Le (Editor), 1001 Figures and Events in World History, Hai Phong Publishing House 
(2006); So Nhat Ly. Tran Ngoc Lan (Collector and editor), Stories of the Spiritual World (2nd 
printing), Culture and Information Publishing House, Hanoi (2006); Le Thuy Chi (Edi-
tor), 100 Most Powerful Figures in the World History, Culture and Information Publishing 
House, Hanoi (2007); Hoang Tam Xuyen (Editor), Theravada Buddha Teachings (TN Ngoc 
Duyen edit), Religious Publishing House, 2007 (Buddhist Calendar Year of 2551); Da Lai 
La Ma, Methods for Happily Life (translated by Venerable Thich Tri Chon, Ph. D.), Phuong 
Dong Publishing House, Hochiminh City (2007); Da Lai La Ma (translated by Hoang 
Phong), Phuong Dong Publishing House, Hochiminh city (2008); Nguyen Huy Co, Tran 
Huu Nung (Edit), Culture and Information Publishing House, Hanoi (2008); Dan Thien, 
12 Constellations & Human Life (Translated by Nguyen Thi Ha), Danang Publishing House 
(2008); Thousand Years of Eastern Knowledge, Hanoi National University Publishing 
House (2008); Baild. T. Spalding; and Mysterious Lives of Tibetan Shaman (Translated by 
Nguyen Van Su), Encyclopedia Publishing House (2009). And others.
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First: Ineffective institutionalisation of governmental “check and balance” 
mechanisms will normally lead to a general lack of transparency amongst 
govern mental agencies and offi cials;
Second: In such non-transparent/non-accountable environments, national 
leaders will often fi nd it easy to disregard the opinions and beliefs of scholars, 
critics, and the general population. This, in turn, will often foster increasingly 
arbitrary, subjective and unilateral actions on their part. Such capriciousness can 
make it virtually impossible for any State apparatus to objectively organize 
- and/or effectively realize - State power;
Third: Stubborn refusal to listen to positive proponents of public opinion, 
as well as to consider peaceful reactions of the people, will also often create an 
environment where national leaders may succumb to the temptation of engag-
ing in deprivations and abuses of power;
Fourth: Failing to stem such deprivations of power will cause the State ap-
paratus to become increasingly corrupted through a series of serious consequences in 
internal affairs. Signifi cantly, they will become increasingly alienated from their 
citizens and administrative bureaucracies. The symptoms of such alienation will 
normally include increasingly corrupt State offi cials, increasingly authoritative 
attitudes among these offi cials, greater impositions on the functions of democracy, 
increasingly arbitrary behaviour - and dictatorship. All of which will create the loss 
of confi dence of the international community in the affairs of the nation in question;
Fifth: Corruption within the internal agencies of State, as well as the interna-
tional community’s loss of confi dence in the external affairs of the State, will lead 
to the State apparatus being condemned by the people and losing its rightful 
place in society. Meanwhile, as the people lose confi dence in their national 
leadership, they will no longer support their leadership. This will often cause 
them to conduct an uprising (or armed struggle) against the old State apparatus. 
In this regard, it is worth recalling the famous early 20th century dictum of 
Russian jurist V. I. Lenin regarding revolutionary changes, to wit: it is the right 
time for the blooming of an armed uprising when “the lower classes no longer 
stand as before while the upper classes no longer manage in an old manner”;
Sixth: In the end, because of the struggle of the people, the old State ap-
paratus will be completely destroyed. The people will then establish a new State 
power system with a new prestigious leadership (in internal and foreign affairs), 
who will work for the common benefi t of society and the people. To do so, they 
will establish a new legal and political system for the advancement of society, 
freedom, democracy and human rights.
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V. CONCLUSION:
In conclusion, there is more than enough evidence to conclude that a system 
of “checks and balances” of public power is one of the seven most important 
elements necessary for the creation of a “rule of law State”. Conversely, the 
development of a “rule of law State” will never be successful without the crea-
tion of an effective and practical State-power check regime through the public system 
(i.e. internal check regime of the State power system) to ensure the balance based on 
“checks and balances” of the three branches of power (legislative, executive, 
and judicial).
Sadræaj
Le Van Cam *
SUSTAV PROVJERA I RAVNOTEÆA: PRETPOSTAVKA USPJE©NOG 
RAZVOJA PRAVNE DRÆAVE U VIJETNAMU
Autor razmatra sustav provjera i ravnoteæa (checks and balances) kao prepostavke 
za uspjeπnu uspostavu i razvoj pravne dræave u Vijetnamu. Uz opÊi pregled defi nicije 
vladavine prava i njezinih osnovnih naËela, u radu se prikazuju teorijska razmatranja 
o djelovanju sustava provjera i ravnoteæa u pravnoj dræavi, njihova osnovna obiljeæja 
te se ukazuje na posljedice vladina neuvaæavanja ovog sustava. ZakljuËak je autora da 
je sustav provjera i ravnoteæa javnih vlasti nuæan za stvaranje pravne dræave te da 
razvoj pravne dræave nikad nije uspjeπan bez stvaranja uËinkovitog i praktiËnog sustava 
provjera javnih vlasti putem javnog sustava, kojim se osigurava ravnoteæa u trima 
granama vlasti - zakonodavnoj, izvrπnoj i sudskoj. 
KljuËne rijeËi: sustav provjera i ravnoteæa, pravna dræava, Vijetnam
*  Prof. dr. sc. Le Van Cam, Pravni fakultet, Nacionalno sveuËiliπte Vijetnama u Hanoju
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Zusammenfassung
Le Van Cam *
DAS SYSTEM DER HEMMNISSE UND GLEICHGEWICHTE: 
VORAUSSETZUNG EINER ERFOLGREICHEN ENTWICKLUNG 
DES RECHTSSTAATES IN VIETNAM
Der Autor erörtert das System der Hemmnisse und Gleichgewichte (checks and 
balances) als Voraussetzung der erfolgreichen Konstituierung und Entwicklung eines 
Rechtsstaates in Vietnam. Neben einem allgemeinen Überblick über die Defi nition der 
Herrschaft des Rechts und ihre Grundprinzipien werden in diesem Beitrag theoretische 
Überlegungen über das Wirken des Systems der Checks and Balances im Rechtsstaat 
und ihre Hauptmerkmale angestellt sowie aufgezeigt, welche Folgen es hat, wenn eine 
Regierung dieses System nicht beachtet. Der Autor kommt zu dem Schluss, dass das 
System der Checks and Balances in Bezug auf die öffentlichen Gewalten erforderlich ist, 
um einen Rechtsstaat zu verwirklichen, und dass die Entwicklung eines Rechtsstaates 
ohne die Einführung eines wirksamen und praktischen Systems zur Überprüfung der 
öffentlichen Gewalten durch ein öffentliches System, mit dem das Gleichgewicht in den 
drei Gewalten, der Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative, gewährleistet wird, niemals 
Erfolg haben kann.
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